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Abstract 
 
The paper investigates the effects of the entry price scheme for fresh fruit and vegetables.  The 
analysis is conducted on the European prices of tomatoes, lemons and apples for some of the 
main competing countries on the European domestic markets: Morocco, Argentina, Turkey and 
China. The econometric analysis is based on testing and estimating a switching vector 
autoregressive model with endogenous threshold entry price level. The model shows the 
isolation effects and the accumulation of Standard Import Values above the trigger entry price. 
This paper contributes to clarify the role played by the Entry Price System in avoiding or 
deterring low priced imports from main European partner Countries. 
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INTRODUCTION  
During the last decades the role and the evaluation of agricultural policies have animated 
scientists and policymakers’ debates, and the agricultural policies implemented in the European 
Union have largely been in the spotlight (cfr. Cardamone, 2011; Kempen et al., 2011; Sieber 
and Dominguez, 2011; Soregaroli et al. 2011; Viaggi et al., 2011 as recent studies).  
Among others, a rather complex system of agricultural policies implemented in the 
European Union is the import regime for fresh fruit and vegetables. There are several reasons 
explaining such complexity arising from the circumstance that the European Union is at the 
same time the largest importing country in the world and one of the most relevant producing 
countries. Such an import regime should help to attain different objectives that, in some 
situations, could be conflicting: the protection and the stabilization of revenues of domestic 
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producers; the supply of large and differentiated provisions to domestic consumers at reasonable 
price; the integration of the import regime within the international relationships promoted by the 
European Union, particularly with developing and neighbouring countries.  
The main instrument of the EU import regime for fresh Fruit and Vegetables (F&V) is 
certainly the Entry Price System (EPS). The rationale of this non tariff barrier, as it comes out 
from the previous reference price system introduced in the first Common Market Organization 
of F&V, is to allow imports of F&V assuring EU market supply while avoiding that 
“abnormally” low price imports could create “disturbances of Community markets”. The 
working of the EPS is well known and widely analyzed by several authors (e.g. Swimbank and 
Ritson, 1995; Cioffi and dell’Aquila, 2004; Emlinger, Jacquet and Lozza, 2008; Goetz and 
Grethe, 2009; Emingler, Lozza and Jacquet, 2010; Garcia, Gomez and Villanueva, 2010; Goetz 
and Grethe, 2010), but a consensus on its effectiveness is still lacking. Furthermore, while 
«entry prices for many products are probably not protective, and could readily be abolished» 
(Swinbank, 2011), it is also likely they produce (still unclear) distortive effects deserving further 
investigations (Winchester, 2011; Li and Beghin, forthcoming). In 2008 the fruits and vegetable 
Common Agricultural Policy has been largely modified despite the entry price system has not 
been changed: further investigations on its effects would be very relevant for future policy 
decisions. 
One feature of the EPS is the possibility given to importers to legally avoid the payments 
of the specific tariffs when the Standard Import Values (SIVs) are below the Trigger Entry Price 
(TEP). In order to circumvent the specific tariff, importers may delay imports until the SIVs are 
above the TEP, or may declare a final sale price of their lots higher than the entry price. 
Therefore it may happen that European imports of fruits and vegetables occur also in periods in 
which the SIVs are below the TEP. This situation has created wider uncertainty on the effects 
played by the EPS on trade flows as well as on its restrictiveness. 
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Among the still open issues on the EPS, there is the assessment of the effects played on 
the stabilization of European domestic prices, namely the main motivation of such import 
regime. As showed in Cioffi et al. (2011), for some products and importing countries the EPS 
affects prices, because when the SIVs are below the 92% of the TEP and the Maximum Tariff 
Equivalent (MTE) is applied, the price determination process of EU products follows a pattern 
different from the normal one, which occurs when SIVs are higher. Such a particular price 
behavior implies an isolation of the internal market from import prices. The effectiveness of the 
EPS in the EU price stabilization is clear in few cases because it depends on trade volumes and 
on the origin of imported goods. However, in these cases the resulting stabilization effects, as 
well as the support effects on EU domestic prices, are rather negligible. 
Goetz and Grethe (2009), analyzing the distribution of SIVs around the entry price, 
conclude that for several products and exporting countries there is an accumulation of SIVs 
slightly above the TEP. Such feature is regarded as an indicator that «exporters often supply 
their product at the lowest possible price while complying with the EP» (Goetz and Grethe, 
2009, p.85). Moreover, specific tariffs are also levied beside the MFN tariff when the SIVs are 
below the TEP but higher than the 92% of the TEP2. Therefore it is worth to analyze if the main 
effects of the EPS are obtained at a level higher than the 92% of the TEP. While in Cioffi et al. 
(2011) the analysis was based on the exogenous threshold of the 92% of the TEP in order to 
conclude on the presence of two different price determination processes, in this paper we 
address a twofold problem: for cases in which an isolation effect exists, we assess whether there 
is an endogenous threshold higher than the 92% of the entry price, in other terms whether the 
isolation is obtained at a level higher than the entry price. While for cases in which the entry 
price system seemed not effective, we test for the presence of an endogenous threshold at which 
a sheltering of the EU the domestic prices from low priced imports is shown.  
The hypotheses we aim to test have clear and important policy implications. Firstly, 
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detecting a threshold able to isolate the EU market higher than the current TEP implies that 
while the current policy is effective, we cannot assert it is an efficient policy tool. Secondly, for 
cases in which the entry price threshold seems ineffective in isolating the EU market, we would 
conclude on the appropriateness of the import policy for market protection. The analysis is 
carried out performing linearity tests to asses changes of the price determination processes. 
Subsequently, through an appropriate switching-regime autoregressive model, the threshold 
variable is endogenously determined. The proposed approach deepens previous analyzes 
distinguishing the isolation and deterrence effects of the entry price system: the former is due to 
a change in prices determination processes, the latter consists in an accumulation of SIVs above 
the 92% of the entry price.  
Our paper aims to contribute to the debate as policy guidance for policymakers by 
clarifying the effects of entry price system on the prices of imported products and by showing 
the categories of fruits and vegetables categories for which the system is hardly able to ensure 
an efficient protection.  
The remainder of the paper is as follows: section 2 presents a brief review of recent 
papers on entry price system and the relevance of the products analyzed in the paper; section 3 
is focused on the theoretical framework and the methodological approach; results are set out in 
section 4 while conclusions and final remarks are developed in the last section. 
RELEVANCE AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE ENTRY PRICE SYSTEM: AN OPEN DEBATE  
The external protection of European fruits and vegetables is modified by preferential trade 
agreements, contracted particularly with Southern Mediterranean countries. The original 
agreement introduced a zero tariff import quota, which has been subject to the fulfilment of the 
reference price system. The entry price system, introduced in 1995, was applied to the products 
already covered by the reference price, except a few products whose imports, after the 
enlargement of the EU to include Spain and Portugal Standard Import Values, had become 
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negligible. The functioning of the EPS is based on the daily calculation of the of produce 
imported from a country. The SIV is an estimation of the cif import price through the weighted 
average of market prices of that product collected on the main European markets3. SIVs are 
published the working day following calculation. If the published SIV of a product imported 
from a country is lower than the entry price by less than 8%, besides the tariff, imports from that 
country are also charged of a specific duty that is roughly equal to the difference between the 
entry price and the SIV. If the SIV is below 92% of the entry price, the specific duty applied 
besides the tariff is the Maximum Tariff Equivalent. The amount of the MTE for the different 
products is generally so high that its charge would make imports unprofitable. 
In last decade a growing number of papers and articles focused on several aspects of the 
entry price system, with main concern to its relevance and effectiveness for European market 
stabilization. Cioffi and dell’Aquila (2004) showed that EPS played a relevant role on the 
European imports of fruits and vegetables. More recently an evaluation report on the EPS casted 
doubt on previous results, showing that for some F&V products covered by the import regime 
the import growth rate did not differ from that not covered by the EPS (Agrosynergie, 2008). 
Emlinger et al. (2010) focused attention on Mediterranean countries showing their significant 
preferences compared to other countries exporting to the EU. Goetz and Grethe (2009) by mean 
of a multivariate statistic analysis approach showed that the relevance of the EPS is not 
homogeneous among different products and origins, being wider for more perishable products 
and for neighbouring partner countries. Garcia Alvarez Coque et al. (2010) found that the 
removal of the EPS or reduction of the Trigger Entry Price would have moderate impact on 
prices of European domestic products.  
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Tomatoes, lemons and apples are relevant study cases either because of a large number of 
Standard Import Values are calculated and published by the EU Commission and because the 
EPS is applied all year long: in the case of tomato the two most relevant EU partner countries 
are Morocco and Turkey; for lemons the two major partner countries are Argentina and Turkey; 
as regard apples, China is an exporter to Europe, which is becoming more and more relevant 
(Table 1).  
Spain is the chief European exporter of tomatoes, whilst Morocco is the main exporting 
country of tomatoes to the EU, with a share of about 80% on total exports. Turkey, the second 
partner for trading volume, accounts for a much smaller share (about 7-8%). However, Turkey 
exports tomatoes mainly during summer months, when imports from Morocco are almost zero. 
The competition between Spain and Morocco, at the highest from October to March, is very 
intense either because of the similar production seasons and target markets, technologies and 
varieties. 
Spain is also the main European producer of lemons (about 650.000 tons per year) and a net 
intra-EU exporter of lemons. Globally, the EU is a net importer of lemons (around 400.000 tons 
per year): Argentina is the main partner country, supplying the 50-60% of total import mainly 
from May to October, whilst Turkey is the second partner country with a share of 20% spanned 
from September to April. 
China is a growing apple exporter during the entire year. Netherlands, Spain and United 
Kingdom are the main partners importing, respectively, 43%, 22% and 17% of the total volume 
traded to EU.  
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Source: EUROSTAT 
 
THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK 
In order to investigate the effects of the entry price system on European domestic prices of 
fruits and vegetables, as well as to test for the aforementioned hypotheses, it is assumed that EU 
is a large country in fruits and vegetables world trade, and price of imported products depend on 
European markets equilibria. It is also assumed that the domestic and imported F&V products 
are imperfect substitute in the EU consumers demand, hence domestic and imported produce 
have similar price determination processes. 
 
Moreover, if the entry price system is effective, the dynamics of European prices and 
Standard Import Values are influenced by the position of the SIVs with respect to the entry 
price, hence conditional to the application of the Maximum Tariff Equivalent. The empirical 
specification is a non-linear two-regimes Threshold Vector Auto-Regressive model (TVAR): 
 
              · 	

 , 
  
      1   · 	
 , 
           · 

 , 
       1   · 
 , 
     
               (1) 
Table 1 -  Export flows towards European Union for selected Countries (.000 €)  Tomatoes Lemon Apples 
 
Morocco Turkey Turkey Argentina China 
 
     
2007 240844 26462 45191 132379 33608 
      
  January  36452 1492 4340 334 6369 
  February 29509 758 1950 - 4230   March 35580 4908 1424 - 3365 
  April 36065 9560 497 171 5585 
  May 9274 2355 24 5366 5082 
  June 2320 1231 - 14779 2812 
  July 1415 66 - 36049 1691 
  August 1366 148 - 39782 259 
  September 987 352 2731 25258 39 
  October 12718 141 13248 9767 12 
  November 33416 553 10994 870 999 
  December 41738 4893 9980 - 3159 
 
     
2008 217951 17341 46588 250684 29410 
2009 249277 19760 54759 111454 13643 
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where  represents the switching variable determining when regime I (the “normal” regime) or 
regime II occur, Pt are daily prices of EU domestic F&V produce, SIVt represent the daily 
Standard Import Values, and the error terms (ε) are assumed to be identically and independently 
distributed with mean 0 and variance σ2. In our theoretical model the first regime is defined by 
the normal functioning of the price determination process. It differs from the second regime 
which occurs when the SIVs are below the entry price threshold4. We refined the model by 
estimating an endogenous threshold (details are provided in appendix).  
As preliminary step we tested for the presence of two regimes versus one regime in the price 
determination process described in (1). The refuse of the null hypothesis may open the way for 
two interesting outcomes. The first case occurs when the European domestic price is influenced 
by the SIVs in the first regime, while the relationship is lost in the second regime (statement 
A)5: the entry price system determines an isolation effect. The second situation would be when 
the linearity test refuses the null hypothesis and the SIVs tend to accumulate above the 92% of 
the entry price. In such a situation we cannot conclude on the isolation effects of the EPS: it is 
likely to play a deterrence effect (statement B).  
A further investigation is made by testing for the endogenous threshold that is able to 
produce the above mentioned isolation effect. Finally, we quantify the accumulation of SIVs 
above the entry price in order to explore the hypothesis advanced by Goetz and Grethe (2009). 
We propose a case-specific index, which takes into account the SIVs and EU price dynamics, by 
                                                     
4
 Similar approaches have been followed in several macroeconomic studies: Tsionas and Christopoulos (2003) 
analyzed the convergence of macroeconomic variables and inflation; Alba and Park (2005) investigated the 
relationships among the German Mark and the Turkish Lira; Chen and Lee (2005) deepen on the relationships 
among government size and economic growth.  
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elaborating the information derived by the TVAR econometric model: the accumulation index 
(AI) is the ratio of SIVs accumulating between the 92% of the TEP and the endogenous 
threshold estimated through specification (1). The AI ranges from 0 to 1: the higher the index 
value, the larger the share of SIVs accumulating above the entry price6. 
The adopted econometric methodology, through linearity tests and estimation of switching 
regime models, is described in the remaining paragraphs. 
Testing effectiveness 
The first step of our analysis aims to assess whether European domestic prices and Standard 
Import Values relationships are affected by non-linearity. The non-linearity is a first evidence of 
possible effects played by the Entry Price System. In particular, if non-linearity in the 
relationships among EU prices and SIVs is detected we conclude that the entry price system 
plays an active role in the price determination process. The analysis is conducted by using the 
Sup-Wald testing procedure proposed by Lo and Zivot (2001). The rationale of the test is to 
assess whether or not the two regimes are statistically not different. A rejection of the null 
hypothesis casts doubt on the linear nature of the relationships among EU prices and SIVs and 
therefore opens the way for checking the EPS effects.   
Testing isolation and deterrence effects 
The second step of the analysis consists in the estimation of the model described in (2). In 
order to characterize the stabilization effects of the EPS we use an iterative procedure to 
estimate the model with different threshold levels. The methodology consists in the estimation 
of a two-regimes TVAR model described by the following system: 
 
   4           /0 · 	
-  , -   
      1  /0 · 	-  , -            /0 · 
- , -        1  /0 · - , -      (2)      
                                                     
6
 Values of zero indicates that the 92% of the TEP is the most fitting threshold capable to capture the different 
functioning of the two different prices regimes and that SIVs seem not to accumulate above the 92% of the TEP. 
Conversely, values equal to one are possible only when the SIVs never fall below the 92% of the TEP. 
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with  
 
 /0  1      %	         
  . /0  . 0.92 ·  890      ':!"$ %*"                                            
 
where i=1, … , n and /0
 
represents an endogenous threshold higher than the threshold above 
which the MTE is applied (i.e. /0 . /;  0.92 ·  89). The variable It allows to separate the 
data in two sub-samples according to the relative position of SIVs with respect to the threshold. 
 
As far as tomato imported from Morocco is concerned, since they are imported under a 
preferential zero tariff quota with a reduced entry price, while such tariff rate quota  are binding 
and change during the periods under consideration, we introduced dummy variables to capture 
the effects of the quota expansion, from 150.676 to 175.00 tons, in 2003, and of the introduction 
of a further conditional quota (45.000 tons) by 2006. 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
The daily prices were extracted from the Agriview database of the European Commission, 
which collect prices on European wholesale Fruits and Vegetables markets of different member 
countries. Data on daily Standard Import Values are calculated by the EU Commission. All 
prices are reported in euro and expressed in current terms.  
The analysis has been conducted on SIVs of selected countries and prices of relevant EU 
markets. The European domestic tomatoes prices were collected on the Almeria (Spain) 
wholesale market, an important tomatoes producing area whose products directly compete with 
tomatoes imported from Morocco. The SIVs of tomatoes imported from Turkey have been 
compared with European prices collected from the French market of Chateau Renard. As regard 
the cases of lemons, we considered the SIVs of imports from Argentina and Turkey and the EU 
domestic prices collected on the Murcia (Spain) wholesale market, located in one of the main 
Spanish lemon producing area. Finally, the SIVs of apples from China have been related to EU 
prices of Geldermalsen, an important production market.  
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To sum up, the five study cases are as follows: series collected on the Almeria (Spain) 
market to analyze the effect of Moroccan tomatoes SIVs (case a); series from Chateau-Renard 
(France) to analyze the effect of Turkish tomatoes SIVs (case b); series of Murcia (Spain) prices 
to analyze the Turkish lemons SIVs (case c) and Argentinean lemons SIVs (case d); prices 
collected on Geldermalsen (Netherlands) market to analyze the effects of Chinese apples SIVs 
(case e).  
The choice of such series was constrained by the availability of data for the relevant periods. 
Certainly, the strategy may have some weakness as a possible low degree of integration between 
the markets we chose and the SIVs could hide the EPS effects. 
Time series of daily prices and SIVs refer to weekdays from Monday to Friday and contain 
data for the season in which transactions are registered: November-March (a); April-October 
(b); October–May (c); May-October (d); January-December (e). Prices from different years are 
combined to obtain a unique sample and cover the periods 2000-2007 (case a), 2000-2004 (case 
b), 1998-2006 (cases c and d), 2004-2007 (case e).  
 
Testing effectiveness 
Our first step consisted in testing the hypothesis that the entry price system influences the 
dynamics of domestic and imported prices. The empirical validation of such a statement 
consists in testing for the presence of a non-linear relationships among prices.  
 
Results presented in table 2 show the rejection, at 10% level, of the null hypothesis of a 
linear relationships between the European domestic prices and SIVs for all but case d. In four 
Table 2 -  LR linearity tests 
 a b c d e 
τ 
 
    0.1 0.2 0.1 0.25 0.1 
N     1 1 3 2 3 
test statistic      22.060 19.184 33.571 20.378 43.055 
p-value        0.063 0.061 0.062 0.162 0.004 
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out of five cases, the Entry Price System induces a non-linear relationships among prices and 
SIVs.  
Our results are coherent with other studies related to the relevance of the entry price 
system (e.g. Cioffi et al. , 2011; Goetz and Grethe,2009) and confirm the relevant role played by 
such a trade policy. Indeed, these preliminary outcomes need to be considered with caution, as 
the linearity tests may suffer from low statistical power: a deeper investigation is attained 
through the estimation of the threshold vector autoregressive model.  
Moreover, whether the measure is effective for all products and import countries is a 
still unresolved issue: in  particular the effectiveness, rather than the relevance, still cannot be 
inferred. 
     Testing isolation and deterrence effects 
Besides the estimation of the econometric model (2), results are interpreted by 
computing an index for the accumulation of SIVs between /; and /0: 
G 
HIJ |LM
HI|LN
HIJ |LM
. 
where # represents the share of SIVs pertaining to the second regime taking into 
account the 92% entry price threshold (O;) or the estimated threshold (OP). As aforementioned, 
the higher the accumulation index, the larger the accumulation of SIVs above the 92% of the 
TEP; conversely, the index will assume value equal to zero if no accumulation occurs.  
The index presents some analogies with the “neg. GAP” index, constructed as ratio 
between the share of SIVs below the TEP and the total number of SIVs, and the Q;.;RS  index 
proposed by Goetz and Grethe (2009). The former indicates the share of SIVs below the 92% of 
the entry price, the latter is a descriptive statistics of the accumulation of import values above 
the entry price, being used as indicator of the influence of the trade policy on the domestic 
import price. 
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The importance of the phenomenon of accumulation of SIVs makes it worth to deepen 
its investigation trying to establish a link between the accumulation and entry price system 
effects. The accumulation index proposed in this paper is case-specific, as it takes into account 
the SIVs and EU price dynamics: the share of observations “accumulating” above the TEP is 
function of the endogenous threshold and of prices dynamics7. For cases in which we confirmed 
the relevance of the Entry Price System through the non-linearity tests, the economic 
interpretation of the index is straightforward: index positive values suggest a possible deterrence 
effect of the import policy. In other terms, the accumulation of SIVs above the TEP is a 
necessary but not sufficient condition to conclude on the deterrence effect. 
The results of the least squares estimations, summarized in table 3, allow to analyze the 
heterogeneous situations faced by European policymakers in dealing with different produce and 
import countries.  
Tomatoes imports from Morocco and Turkey seem to be limited by the import regime. 
Indeed, Moroccan SIVs (case a) and domestic prices follow non-linear processes: the 
hypothesis of linearity is rejected. Moreover, the EPS successfully isolates the European 
domestic market8 as SIVs influences EU domestic prices in the “normal” regime, while the 
relationships stop when the tariff withdrawal is applied. Furthermore, the deterrence effect 
played by the import regime leads SIVs to accumulate above the entry price9.  
                                                     
7
 The SIVs close to the TEP will be placed in the first or in the second regime according to their dynamics. The more 
the dynamics of SIVs slightly above the TEP resembles the dynamics prevalent in the second regime, the higher 
the estimated threshold, the share of observations between /; and /0, hence the AI. 
8
 The dummies introduced to take into account the changes in the quota are statistically different from zero showing 
that the larger TRQs induced a decrease in SIVs level. However, we do not include them in the estimations 
presented in table 1 for reasons of space.   
9
 The estimated threshold is 8% higher than /; with accumulation of SIVs above /;  (AI = 0.34).  
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Table 3 – Econometric results 
 Tomatoes Lemons Apples 
 a b c d e 
 Almeria Chateau Renard Murcia Murcia Geldermalsen 
α
I
 
  2.723**  8.524* 0.224      4.523** 0.686 
Pt-1I
 
   0.896***    0.921***     0.963***       0.910***     0.561*** 
Pt-2I         0.422*** 
Pt-3I      
SIVt-1I    0.081***      0.027***   
SIVt-2I      
SIVt-3I      
α
II
 6.336    20.536*** 2.202          3.073*       3.881*** 
Pt-1II
 
   0.952***      0.825***     0.969***       0.932***      0.876*** 
Pt-2II      
Pt-3II      
SIVt-1II      
SIVt-2II      
SIVt-3II      
 Morocco Turkey Turkey Argentina China 
α
I
 1.335 21.181*** 3.736      23.166***   10.645*** 
Pt-1I
 
    0.107***   0.158***     0.093***   
Pt-2I      
Pt-3I      
SIVt-1I     0.853***    0.484***      0.466***       0.281***     0.601*** 
SIVt-2I        0.248***              0.222***           0.241*** 
SIVt-3I        0.119***   
α
II
 
 8.726 15.583* 4.801      14.063***     5.051 
Pt-1II
 
     0.318***    
Pt-2II      
Pt-3II      
SIVt-1II     0.860***        0.380***       0.299***     0.625*** 
SIVt-2II         0.365***       0.381***     0.332*** 
SIVt-3II         0.230***   
      
YM  YZ
YZ
 
+ 8.0% + 14.0% + 0 % + 19.0% + 9.9% 
      
(1) obs. 
in regime 
II with /; 
 
13.0% 
 
11.0% 
 
17.0% 
 
35.0% 
 
11.0% 
      
(2) obs. 
in regime 
II with /0 
 
19.7% 
 
31.7% 
 
17.0% 
 
73.4% 
 
14.5% 
      
(2) – (1)  6.7% 20.7% 0% 38.4% 3.5% 
      
AI 0.34 0.65 0.0 0.52 0.24 
The apexes I and II indicate, respectively, the first and second regime.  
       Significant: *** at <0.001 ; ** at 0.001 ; * at 0.01 
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As far as products imported from Turkey is concerned (case b), we cannot conclude on 
the effectiveness of the import policy in isolating the internal market10: its main effect consists 
in forcing low priced imports to accumulate above the entry price. 
The effectiveness of the import regime for lemons imported from Turkey and Argentina 
is even less clear. In the former case (c), while the non-tariff barrier achieves its isolation goal, 
the SIVs are not likely to accumulate above the threshold price11, casting doubt on the efficacy 
of such a protective policy. Moreover, the latter case (d) highlights further weakness of the 
import regime. Indeed, no isolation effect is likely to be achieved, as the linear relationships 
among the prices is linear and no differences in prices behavior have been detected between the 
two regimes. Hence, we can also barely conclude on a possible “deterrence” effect. There is a 
consensus that the different production seasons in Spain and Argentina lead to an high 
competition in May, which decline more and more until October, when the new harvest season 
begins. Consistently, a large share of SIVs below the 92% of the TEP during periods of low 
competition (e.g. in October is 47% and in May only 15%) is observed.  
Despite the linearity test suggests that prices and SIVs follow a non-linear process,  we 
do not identify any reciprocal influence among SIVs and EU prices allowing to conclude on the 
isolation effect. Indeed, we observe a limited accumulation of SIVs above the entry price12, 
which suggests that, also for apples, the main role of the Entry Price System is to deter low 
priced imports rather than isolate the European market. 
To sum up, in four out of five cases the import regime seems to be effective, as prices 
follows a non-linear process. However, only in two cases - and with greater evidence for 
tomatoes imported from Morocco - the EPS seems able to isolate the EU domestic market. 
                                                     
10
 In this case the hypothesis of linearity test is rejected at 10% level but SIVs do not influence EU prices neither in 
the first nor in the second regime. 
11
 SIVs influence domestic prices only in the normal regime. However, the endogenous threshold coincides with the 
92% of the TEP and no accumulation of SIVs above the threshold is found (AI = 0). 
12
 In particular, the endogenous threshold is identified 9.9% above /; and the index AI equals 0.24. 
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Therefore, the main effect of the Entry Price Regime is likely to be the limitation of low priced 
imports. 
 
CONCLUSIVE REMARKS  
 
The paper deepens on the effects of the entry price system on the prices of European 
Union fruits and vegetables. The analysis has been focused on three selected products, namely 
tomatoes, lemons and apples, in order to explore the effectiveness and efficiency of the trade 
policy. On one hand, it has been tested the effectiveness of the import regime in actively 
influencing the price determination process. On the other hand, we explored the role played by 
the entry price system in isolating the European market rather than limiting low priced imports. 
The analysis has been conducted through an econometric approach consisting in 
estimating a threshold vector autoregressive model. We tested for the existence of an 
endogenous price threshold able to provide an isolation effect. Our findings provide a further 
evidence of the relevance and effectiveness of the entry price regime. 
Moreover, we found an empirical support for the hypothesis made by Goetz and Grethe (2009) 
on the behaviour of trader who tend to supply their products at the lowest possible price able to 
avoid the tariff payment, as well as for the fact that the effects of the entry price system on 
European prices is already played when Standard Import Values are below the entry price and 
the lower specific tariff is applied. Only in few cases, particularly the paradigmatic one of 
tomato imports from Morocco, we found that the Entry Price System plays an insulation effect 
when the SIVs drop below the estimated threshold. In other cases, there is a deterrence effect 
given by an accumulation of SIVs between the estimated threshold and the 92% of the Trigger 
Entry Price while a change in the price determination process is shown.  
If the EPS has effects on the Fruits and Vegetables domestic prices, the stabilization 
effects are small. From this perspective, the results of this analysis are coherent with those 
presented in Cioffi et al. (2011), although the statistical properties are improved. Therefore, the 
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considerations made in that paper on the limited stabilization effects of the EPS remain still 
valid.  
One further issue arises from the circumstance that the econometric analysis confirmed 
the large country hypothesis we made about the European F&V markets. The price of imported 
products are always determined by the EU domestic prices of F&V products. Therefore, the 
Entry Price System does not have the effect of avoiding that abnormally low priced lots 
imported from third countries could interfere with the EU markets. Indeed, we found that when 
market conditions in the EU lead to a domestic prices plunge, prices of imported products quit 
to affect their determination process until the SIVs are again above the threshold. This is 
because EU domestic prices plunges cause low import prices and not vice-versa.  
Finally, the conclusive remarks are mainly concerned with hardly perishable fruits and 
vegetables (e.g. lemons and apples), as the possibility to store those products and circumvent the 
payment of the tariff deprives the Entry Price System of its efficacy (Cioffi and dell’Aquila, 
2004). For these products, it could be advisable to improve the Entry Price System by setting 
more stringent rules able to avoid that foreign products are stored within the European Union 
and sold on the domestic markets at a favourable import value. 
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Methodological appendix  
 
 
Linearity test 
 
Testing for non-linearity in TVAR presents many challenges: one of the main problem 
is the threshold identification under the alternative hypothesis. Tsay proposed a non-parametric 
test for univariate (Tsay, 1989) and multivariate (Tsay, 1998) cases based on an arranged 
autoregression and recursive least squares estimation. On one hand, Tsay’s tests have the 
advantages of being independent by the form of threshold non-linearity, on the other hand, the 
tests are made difficult by the lack of identification of break dates under the null hypothesis of 
linearity.  
Another method to test the null hypothesis of univariate linear model (H0) versus the 
alternative of univariate TAR model with m regimes (HA), has been proposed by Hansen (1997, 
1999). The procedure uses a sup-F type (sup-Wald) test based on the comparison of the sum of 
squared residuals of the linear and non-linear models. Since the test suffers of the so-called 
Davies problem13 (Davies, 1987), Hansen proposed a bootstrap procedure to compute p-values. 
In order to investigate the presence of non-linearity in the relationships between prices and 
SIVs, we tested for non-linearity in threshold vector autoregressive models following the 
approach described in Lo and Zivot (2001) that extended the Hansen’s test to the multivariate 
case. The statistic (LR1m) used is a sup-LR statistic based on the determinants of the residual 
covariance matrix (Σ0) of the unrestricted (Ω, two-regimes model) for which the threshold is 
endogenously determined, and the restricted models (ω, linear model): 
de
f  8gh#1iΣ0i2  h#1iΣ0f(j0)i2k        
where m represents the number of regimes and j0 the estimated threshold. Since the distribution 
of the sup-LR statistic is non-standard, a bootstrap procedure is adopted to compute p-values. 
 
 
                                                     
13
  Davies argues that the unidentification of the threshold parameters under the null hypothesis of linearity influences 
the sup-F asymptotic distributions. Hence, the testing procedure should include simulation techniques to evaluate the 
distributions case-by-case.  
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The linearity tests have been conducted conditional to the trimming parameters14 (τ) and 
number of lags (n). The trimming parameter is 0.1 in all but cases b and d for which the share of 
observations below the 92% of the TEP is far larger than 10%, respectively, 22% and 35%. For 
these cases we adopted a trimming parameter equals to 0.2.  
As far as lemons and apples series is concerned, starting from the VAR(1) specification, 
when the cross-correlogramms of residuals highlight the presence of autocorrelation, we choose 
a larger number of lags according to the Schwarz Information Criterion: 3 lags for cases c and e; 
2 lags for case d. P-values are calculated based on 1000 bootstrap replications. 
 
 
Econometric estimation  
 
The estimation can be seen as a two steps procedure: in the first step we search for the best 
threshold in a range of possible values; in a second step the coefficients are estimated 
conditionally to the optimal threshold detected in the first step.   
Analytically, given the range Θ
 
of possible values for the threshold and lag structure (n), 
the LS estimator of /0 solves the minimization problem 
 
/0  minmn  α
p ∑ r-H-s
 
1/02  αp  ∑ r-H-s
  1/02        
 
where α
and α are the coefficients matrixes, n  and r  represent data matrixes. Our approach 
allows to search the best thresholds (/S) imposing that /0 . 0.92 ·  89. In other terms, we are 
able to determine the optimal threshold level by minimizing the sum of squared residuals. The 
minimization problem to estimate equation (2) has been solved within a range of possible 
                                                     
14
   In TAR models the trimming parameter (τ) indicates the minimum share of observations that need to pertain to 
each regime. Generally, τ ranges from 0.05 to 0.15 and only few indications help in choosing the “best” trimming 
value.  
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thresholds from the 92% of the TEP (/;) to 130% of /;: a larger range of values might lead to 
estimate the model with by assuming an unreasonable entry price level. 
Given the optimal threshold level (/S) from the first step, the LS estimator15 of αt  (αt
, αt) 
solves the minimization problem 
αt  minu n  αt
p v r-
H
-s


/S  αtp  v r-
H
-s

 /S  
 
                                                     
15
   TVAR models are estimated by using the least squares method, shown to be consistent under regularity 
conditions (Tsay, 1989, 1998).  
